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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 17/01/2008

Accident number: 478

Accident time: 10:42

Accident Date: 13/08/2006

Where it occurred: IR No.10/2, Beyr
Mathkour, Wadi Araba
Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Jordan
Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 13/08/2006

ID original source: NS-10-2/13/08/06

Name of source: JES

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: No 10 AP blast

Ground condition: dry/dusty
hard

Date record created: 17/01/2008

Date last modified: 17/01/2008

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:
Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Alt. coord. system:
Map east: E 35.184

Map north: N 30.476

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
metal-detector not used (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
non injurious accident (?)
standing to excavate (?)
use of rake (?)
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Accident report
The report of this accident was made available in November 2007 as a PDF file. Its
conversion to a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The
substance of the report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is
held on record. The accident report is substantially the same as the report for another
accident that occurred on the following day.

INCIDENT REPORT
MINEFIELD TASK ID

- NS - 10 - 02

SECTOR- NORTH SOUTH, PLACE - BEYR MATHKOUR, REGION - WADI ARABA
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY – [Demining group Programme Manager]
SECTION COMMANDER and TEAM LEADER [Names removed]
TEAM: SITE PREPERATION TEAM
TIME OF ACCIDENT: 10:42 AM
DATE OF ACCIDENT: 13 AUG 2006
NATURE OF INJURY: NIL
TYPE OF MINE: NO-10 ISRAELI ANTI PERS MINE

Details from IMSMA report
The incident occurred during ongoing work in the North South Sector minefields. Buried
device detonated while raking with Heavy rake.
A [Demining group] Manual Team One, deminer hit a No.10 AP mine from the top that
resulted in a mine blast. The deminer suffered no injuries. He was wearing his protective Vest
and Goggles. [Photographs of both Victim and PPE showed no damage.] The tines of the
heavy rake were bent.

The crater left by the initiation was approx 15cm deep and 30cm wide.
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The ground at the incident site was hard and flat. The weather at the time was clear, calm and
hot. There was no vegetation.
The demining team was founded 46 days before the accident. The team had been at the site
for 40 days and working at the specific task for five days. They had been working for four
hours on the day of the accident.
The investigation was conducted by [Demining group] programme manager. The report was
compiled and translated by a Medic. The report was printed on the day of the accident:
13/08/2006.
Statements by the Victim and witnesses were referenced [Not attached].
Apart from date changes and the name of the Victim, this report is identical to the report for
the accident that occurred on the following day, 14th August 2006.

Victim Report
Victim number: 638

Name: [Name removed]

Age: 41

Gender: Male

Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not applicable

Time to hospital: Not applicable

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Goggles

Goggles

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT: Photograph of the Victim showed no injuries to face, hands and arms. Noninjurious accident.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the
photographs show that the initiation occurred outside the lane (marking is achieved by side of
lane trenches) on ground that had not been “brushed” with the Light rake. In the correct
procedure, the Light rake is used before the Heavy rake. It seems that Victim was working in
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a manner that conflicted with authorised procedures and his mistake was not corrected. The
secondary cause is listed as “Unavoidable” because there is not enough information in the
report to be certain of the cause, and the deminer may not have been at fault.
The failure of the demining group’s management (who conducted the inquiry) to produce a
detailed report probably reflects their impatience at having to investigate a non-injurious
accident but is still a significant “Management control inadequacy”. This report is substantially
the same as a report for a second accident on the following day. The National demining
authority should have accepted responsibility for conducting their own independent
investigation.
The demining group had put in place the use of a long tool (rake) that kept the Victim far
enough away from a blast to avoid serious injury, but the raking process that this demining
group has pioneered is only safe if systematically conducted in a disciplined manner. As with
any tool, rakes can be misused. The most common misuse is “Hacking” at hard ground with
the Heavy rakes, which this man apparently did. The distance still provided some protection
and probably prevented injury.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under “Notes” refers to the fact that there was no
evidence of any investigation in the papers provided, and no explanation of what occurred. It
is also unacceptable that the report was simply copied and edited for the accident that
occurred on the following day.
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